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Gaza Stripa b s t r a c t
This paper studies how conflict affects household resilience capacity and food security, drawing on panel
data collected from households in Palestine before and after the 2014 Gaza conflict. During this escalation
of violence, the majority of the damages in the Gaza Strip were concentrated close to the Israeli border.
Using the distance to the Israeli border to identify the effect of the conflict at the household level through
an instrumental variable approach, we find that the food security of households in the Gaza Strip was not
directly affected by the conflict. However, household resilience capacity that is necessary to resist food
insecurity declined among Gazan households as a result of the conflict. This was mainly due to a reduc-
tion of adaptive capacity, driven by the deterioration of income stability and income diversification.
However, the conflict actually increased the use of social safety nets (expressed in the form of cash,
in-kind or other transfers that were received by the households) and access to basic services (mainly
access to sanitation) for the households exposed to the conflict. This finding may be related to the support
provided to households in the Gaza Strip by national and international organizations after the end of the
conflict. From a policy perspective, the case of the conflict in the Gaza Strip demonstrates that immediate
and significant support to victims of conflict can indeed help restore resilience capacity.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Violent conflict could reduce households’ food availability and
consumption. For example, the presence of war may effectively
reduce food imports, make food production and purchasing more
dangerous, raise food prices, and reduce food stocks and disposable
income. Significant empirical literature documents such adverse
food security outcomes of war. Martin-Shields & Stojetz (2018)
provide a survey of these war-induced effects on food security.
However, it is less clear how conflict may shape the capacity of
households to cope with adverse shocks in general. There is com-
paratively more analytical ambiguity on this link between conflict
and resilience capacity than in other related fields, and there is less
empirical evidence as well. For example, does conflict increase or
decrease the willingness of families and neighbors to help
adversely-affected households? Does the provision of aid reach
those communities that are more affected by conflict than others?This builds on the growing literature on the micro-level analysis of
violent conflict, which has grown rapidly in recent years (Brück
et al., 2016; Justino, Brück, & Verwimp, 2013).
This paper addresses these research gaps by estimating the
effects of the 2014 conflict in Gaza Strip on both household resili-
ence capacity and food security. Specifically, we estimate the
impact on overall resilience of households, on the distinct ‘‘pillars
of resilience” adopted in this analysis, and on each indicator these
pillars are comprised of. This paper draws on a panel survey of
households conducted before and after the conflict.
The Gaza Strip is part of the Palestinian territories, which also
include the West Bank.1 It borders Israel to its north and east, Egypt
to its south, and the Mediterranean Sea to its west. Israel and the
Gaza Strip are separated by a wall with regulated border crossings.
According to the latest data available from the Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the population density in the Gaza Strip
is very high.2 In 2014, its economy was highly regulated by Israel andto 519 in
3 The Technical Working Group on Resilience Measurement is a group of experts
set up in 2013 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World Food
Programme (WFP) to build consensus on a common analytical framework and
guidelines for food and nutrition security resilience measurement.
4 A review of the different approaches to estimating resilience at the household
level can be found in Constas et al. (2014).
5 The concept of food security originated from the World Food Summit in 1996. The
definition agreed during the Summit is that ‘‘food security exists when all people, at
all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food to
meet their dietary needs and food preferences for a healthy and active life” (FAO,
1996). The concept has been operationalized by FAO in four dimensions – availability,
accessibility, utilization and stability – as presented by Martin-Shields & Stojetz
(2018).
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the Gaza Strip’s population aid dependent (WB, 2015). The Israeli
Defense Forces administer a security corridor along its border with
the Gaza Strip. Before and after the 2014 Gaza conflict, this was a
300 meter wide zone wherein no access is permitted for the first
100 meters, while access on foot to farmers was permitted for the
remaining 200 meters. Food security in the Gaza Strip was very poor
in 2013 and 2014, in contrast with the improvement reported in the
West Bank in the same period (PCBS & FSS, 2016). Following rising
tensions in 2014, a conflict took place between Israel and the Gaza
Strip, from early July until late August. The conflict was very short
in time, but very intense.
The case of Gaza Strip is interesting for several reasons. Firstly,
the conflict was quite brief and consisted of events that were easily
defined, and took place across a well enumerated area for which
sound data is available. The ease with which conflict activity could
be identified was relevant for the methodology used in this analy-
sis, as the brevity of the conflict event meant it could be treated as
a shock rather than a long-lasting war. Second, the data was col-
lected from the same households before and after the conflict,
therefore creating a panel dataset. Third, the survey included a
range of key outcome variables that allow for the study of both
household resilience capacity and food security. In terms of the
external validity of this analysis, the 2014 Gaza conflict is compa-
rable to other brief conflicts, such as that which occurred in Bur-
undi in 2015 and in Georgia in 2008. Further, as this analysis
focuses on the experience of conflict at the household level, this
case study may have wider relevance for households in similar sce-
narios elsewhere, despite their differences in characteristics.
The employed dataset is part of the Socio-Economic and Food
Security (SEFSec) survey, administered regularly by the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in coordination with the Food
Security Sector (FSS) since 2007 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The SEFSec is a monitoring instrument for providing timely infor-
mation on key socio-economic and food-related indicators. The rel-
evant rounds of the panel dataset studied here were collected in
the first quarter of 2014 (two months before the conflict occurred)
and in the first quarter of 2015 (four months after the conflict
occurred).
Given the short and sharp nature of this specific conflict, it was
possible to adopt an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach for esti-
mating the causal effects of conflict on household resilience capac-
ity and food security. First, one question in the post-conflict data
asked if the household’s residence was partially or fully destroyed;
building damage thus represented a direct measure of conflict
exposure and cost within this analysis. Second, we argue that the
distance from a household to the Gaza Strip-Israel border is a proxy
for conflict exposure, especially because aerial bombardment that
took place intensified closer to the border (UNOSTAT, 2014;
OCHA, 2016).
The main findings of the analysis are that although the Gaza
conflict reduced overall household resilience capacity – and specif-
ically the adaptive capacity of households (based on the employ-
ment characteristics of household members, their level of
education, the diversification of income sources, and on the avail-
able coping strategies) – it actually increased household use and
access of social safety nets. These results are interpreted as a reflec-
tion of the severe disruption to labor markets in the Gaza Strip dur-
ing and after the conflict, and as indicative of the strong inflow of
aid into the Gaza Strip in the post-conflict period. Interestingly, the
socio-economic sectors (such as agriculture, services, health, etc.)
that received significant aid contributed to the stabilization of
the resilience capacity of conflict-affected households. Conversely,
the sectors to which aid was not provided (such as for the labor
sector) saw a decline in household resilience capacity. The findings
suggest that a longer or more intense conflict would have erodedhousehold resilience capacity much further, perhaps to a point
below which the recovery capacity could be definitely compro-
mised. While post-conflict assistance can help preserve resilience
capacity, it is not clear if the same can be done while a conflict is
ongoing, given that in this case the relevant household data was
not collected while the conflict in question was taking place.
This contributes at understanding how household resilience is
shaped by a brief, acute conflict – which is a short and sharp shock.
The demonstration of how this type of shock affects different
elements of resilience is a new finding in this emerging literature.
In terms of food security, this analysis captures the effects of con-
flict on food security very precisely.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
reviews the literature on resilience and food security linked to
the literature on the micro-level effects of conflict; Section 3 and
4 introduce the case of the Gaza Strip and the dataset employed,
respectively. Section 5 presents the estimation and identification
approach used in this analysis, while Section 6 summarizes the
results of the analysis and Section 7 concludes.2. Literature review
As suggested by Martin-Shields & Stojetz (2018) ‘‘defining con-
flict is not straightforward”. Accordingly, the number of battle
deaths per year is generally employed for differentiating conflict
and war. In the same article, Martin-Shields & Stojetz (2018) inves-
tigate the literature on the conflict effects on food security. How-
ever, the nexus between conflict and resilience has not been
analyzed yet, to the best of our knowledge.
Resilience is generally expressed as a capacity (Alinovi et al.,
2010; Vaitla et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2014; Barrett & Constas,
2014; Alfani et al., 2015; d’Errico, Garbero, & Constas, 2016;
d’Errico & Pietrelli, 2017; d’Errico & Di Giuseppe, 2018). In this
paper, the definition of resilience used by the Technical Working
Group on Resilience Measurement3 is followed, which sees resili-
ence as ‘‘the capacity that ensures adverse stressors and shocks do
not have long-lasting adverse development consequences”
(Constas, Frankenberger, & Hoddinott, 2014). This definition implies
that: (i) resilience is an outcome-based concept, as is food security in
the case of this paper; (ii) resilience is analyzed with regards to the
experience of specific shocks; (iii) resilience emphasizes long-lasting
effects on the outcome variable at hand; and (iv) resilience explicitly
requires agency, that is, the agent’s actual adoption of livelihood
adaptation strategies to offset the negative impacts of a shock.
Following the FAO Resilience Index and Measurement Analysis
(RIMA) framework (Alinovi, Mane, & Romano, 2008; Alinovi et al.,
2010; FAO, 2016),4 households are the central decision-making
units when it comes to maintaining a certain level of food security
(through consumption smoothing, asset selling, coping strategies,
etc.) when a shock occurs. At the household level, the ‘‘ability to
acquire the food needed by its members to be food secure” makes
a household food secure (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009).5 In fact food
T. Brück et al. /World Development 119 (2019) 203–223 205security changes over time – in the face of shocks and stressors such
as conflict or violence – are linked to resilience; that is, a more resi-
lient household is expected to suffer a smaller reduction in food
security in the face of a negative shock compared to a less resilient
household. Therefore, household resilience capacity and food secu-
rity are strongly interlinked.
Resilience is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Examples of resili-
ence structures can be found in Béné et al. (2012), Béné et al.
(2015), Ellis (2000), Dercon (2002), DFID (2011), and Smith and
Frankenberger (2018). The FAO-RIMA approach, followed in this
paper, coined the following dimensions (or pillars) of resilience:
Access to Basic Services (ABS), Assets (AST), Adaptive Capacity
(AC) and Social Safety Nets (SSN). FAO (2016) extensively explains
this conceptual framework of resilience, expanding on the defini-
tions of these four pillars. The advantage of this approach is that
it allows the analysis of the effect of conflict to be unpacked
through the different aspects of resilience. Otherwise, the interpre-
tation of the Resilience Capacity Index is a latent construct which
approximates a measure of resilience capacity, ranging from low
to high.
Access to services, such as schools, health centers, water provi-
sion, sanitation and markets, is considered a fundamental aspect
of household resilience capacity. For example, road density can
influence not only access to markets, which is crucial for generat-
ing income, but also the efficacy of aid distribution in response to
a disaster (Adger et al., 2004). Recent evidence supports the asso-
ciation between access to basic services before a disaster and the
rate of recovery after a disaster (Khan, 2014). Additionally, access
to basic services can contribute to the reduction of illness risk,
which is linked to inadequate sanitation and water supplies
(Dercon, Bold, & Calvo, 2008). According to Justino (2012), there
is ‘‘little evidence on the impact of armed conflict on the opera-
tion and access to local markets”. Depending on the dynamics of
the conflict in a given situation, conflicts might involve the
destruction of infrastructure at the meso-level, for example of
health or transportation facilities. How this can affect household
resilience capacity, at the micro-level, depends on how the
destruction translates into hardship for households in each speci-
fic context.
Productive and non-productive assets are considered relevant
aspect of resilience. While productive assets contribute to the
income-generating process, they can also be sold to protect con-
sumption in the case of shocks – which is known as consumption
smoothing (Hoddinott, 2006). The destruction of assets is one of
the channels studied in the literature on the effects of conflicts
on local populations (Justino, 2012). The potential effect of conflict
on resilience capacity via assets can in general be differentiated
according to the type of violence (ground operations versus air
attacks) and the asset ownership of the household.6 As suggested
by Martin-Shields & Stojetz (2018), one of the links between conflict
and food security is agricultural production. Access to land and agri-
cultural assets, if weakened because of the conflict, may affect farm-
ers’ food production as well as their resilience capacity. Furthermore,
violence, through forced displacement, can modify location specific
assets as land.
Social safety nets – namely transfers received by the household,
whether formal or informal, cash or in-kind – can act as insurance
mechanisms before the occurrence of a shock, or can be activated
after a shock has taken place. For example, Yang & Choi (2007) find
in a case study on Philippines that remittances increased when
households are affected by shocks, effectively functioning as insur-
ance instruments to cope with the shock. On the other hand,6 For example, rural households are affected by different aspects of conflict
compared to urban households, such as the destruction of crop farms affecting rural
areas while damage to infrastructure in a capital city affecting urban areas.Ghorpade (2017) shows that the exposure to long term-conflict
in Pakistan reduces the likelihood and amount of remittances.
Some recent literature investigates, with mixed results, the effects
of violence on social capital and attitudes (i.e., the possible increase
or decrease of altruism between households in conflict areas),
which might influence the flow of informal transfers between
households. While Voors et al. (2012) show that altruism toward
neighbors increased for individuals exposed to the civil war in Bur-
undi, De Luca & Verpoorten (2015) find that in Uganda, there is a
short-term negative effect of violence on self-reported trust in gen-
eral and on people’s association membership. Overall, there is a
lack of evidence on the changes that take place within social alli-
ances and networks in contexts of violent conflict, although the
relationship is well recognized. Furthermore, formal transfers can
be activated by humanitarian organizations after the occurrence
of a shock. Crost, Felter, & Johnston (2016) underline that condi-
tional cash transfer programs are becoming more popular in
conflict-affected areas around the world. Focusing on food trans-
fers, Tranchant et al. (2019) find that this type of assistance pro-
tects the food security of rural population in Mali while Verme &
Gigliarano (2019) propose a method for determining the optimal
targeting strategy of food voucher programs in humanitarian
context.
Finally, resilience is seen as the capacity not only to absorb
shocks, but also to reorganize while the effects of a shock are
taking place (Alinovi et al., 2008; Folke, 2006; Walker et al.,
2004). Therefore, adaptive capacity is seen as a fundamental ele-
ment in reacting and adapting to shocks such as conflicts. The
ability of a household to change income-generating activities
might result in an positive outcome for one household (for
instance, households effectively gain access to new markets,
such as informal or illegal markets via support for associated
conflict actors), but a negative outcome for another, even follow-
ing exactly the same shock (Justino, 2012). Human capital and
livelihood diversification are crucial aspects of the household
adaptive capacity (FAO, 2016; Smith & Frankenberger, 2018).
Additionally, the demographic structure of a household, i.e. the
share of household members economically active, affects house-
hold adaptive capacity (Vincent, 2007). Mercier et al. (2017) note
that conflict might affect the household members composition,
thus affecting the ability to pursue work and education for sur-
viving household members.
In sum, the role of household resilience in a scenario of conflict
is of interest for two main reasons. Firstly, more resilient house-
holds can mitigate the potentially negative effects of conflict on
household food security. In fact, more resilient households are
expected to smooth the effect of the shock (in this case, the con-
flict) on food security compared to less resilient households. Sec-
ond, conflicts might affect household resilience itself by directly
affecting its various dimensions.
This paper seeks to understand whether the 2014 conflict in
the Gaza Strip impacted resilience and, consequently, food secu-
rity for households in the Gaza Strip. In particular, we are inter-
ested in understanding if a reduction in resilience took place as a
result of the conflict and through which components. We will do
so by estimating the resilience capacity and its pillars through
the FAO-RIMA approach, and assessing the impact of the conflict
on each of those. This paper specifically examines the following
questions:
 Did the 2014 conflict in the Gaza Strip affect (presumably
adversely) the food security and resilience of households living
in the Strip?
 If any effect is detected on overall resilience capacity, what are
the main drivers of such changes? Which are the main resili-
ence components affected by the violent conflict?
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The Gaza Strip is a very small (360 square kilometers) and den-
sely populated (1.8 million) region of the Palestinian territories.7 In
the past few years, the Palestinian territories have seen a gradual
decline in economic performance and an increase in political uncer-
tainty (PCBS & FSS, 2016).
The economy of the Gaza Strip has been struggling since before
the 2014 conflict. The region’s economic growth rate started to
decline in 2012 as a result of sharp drop in foreign aid, and signif-
icantly deteriorated in the first quarter of 2014. This sharp drop
was primarily related to the closure of tunnels8 that connected
the Gaza Strip to Egypt, representing the main trade channels for
the Gaza Strip after the blockade of the Gaza Strip by Israel9 (WB,
2014). Unemployment reached 45 percent in the Gaza Strip by mid-
dle of 2014, particularly affecting women and youth (WB, 2014).
According to the latest data available, a quarter of the Palestinian
population in both the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank lived in pov-
erty in 2014, with the rate in the Gaza Strip (39 percent) twice as
high as in the West Bank (WB, 2014).
During the summer of 2014, the tension between Palestinian
armed groups,10 which are linked to political movements of various
ideologies, operating in the Gaza Strip and Israel escalated to violent
conflict. The number of rocket attacks being sent from the Gaza Strip
into Israel increased during June 2014. The discovery of tunnels
leading into Israel also heightened the sense of insecurity among
the Israeli population. Meanwhile, tensions in the West Bank ran
high. Widespread protests and violent clashes ensued between
Palestinians and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). On June 12, 2014,
three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered in the West
Bank. In response, Israel launched a search and arrest operation,
which lasted until the bodies of the teenagers were found on June
30. On July 2, a 16-year-old Palestinian teenager was murdered in
what appeared to be an act of revenge over the murdered Israeli
teenagers.
A few days later, the IDF commenced an operation called ‘‘Pro-
tective Edge” in the Gaza Strip, with the objective of stopping the
rocket attacks and the conflict operations against Israel. Up to
ten organized armed groups were active in the Gaza Strip in the
summer of 2014. However, their military capacity and their level
of involvement in the hostilities against the IDF varied signifi-
cantly. Several of these groups not only fired rockets (4,881) and
mortar shells (1,753), but also participated in violent confronta-
tions with the IDF (HRC, 2015). After an initial phase of airstrikes,
on July 17, 2014 Israel launched a ground operation inside the Gaza
Strip. A third phase began on August 5, characterized by alternat-
ing ceasefires and ongoing airstrikes. The operation concluded on7 For further information on the Palestinian territories – the West Bank and Gaza
Strip – visit the country profile for this region on the World Bank website: http://
www.worldbank.org/en/country/westbankandgaza.
8 The tunnel trade involves the movement of goods through illegal tunnels that
were dug underneath the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The main exports
from the Gaza Strip are fruits and flowers, which are exported mainly to the
Netherlands (WB, 2014).
9 The Israeli government ordered the IDF to restrict the movement of goods and
people into and out of the Gaza Strip on 19th September 2007, with the decision B/34
(Etkes & Zimring, 2015).
10 The two largest groups were the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades and Al-Quds
Brigades. Another relevant group was the Al-Nasser Salah Al-Din Brigades, which is
the military wing of the Popular Resistance Committees (a coalition of armed
Palestinian groups). The other groups with a lower level of engagement include: the
Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP); the Gaza branch of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the military wing
of Fatah (a Palestinian nationalist political party); the National Resistance Brigades;
and the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).
Other, smaller armed groups were present in the Gaza Strip, but it remains unclear
whether they participated in the 2014 hostilities.August 26, when both Israel and Palestinian armed groups agreed
on an unconditional ceasefire.
According to HRC (2015), during the summer of 2014, six Israeli
civilians were killed (as reported by the Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs) and up to 1,600 Israelis injured, including over 270
children (as reported by the Israeli Ministry of Health). Addition-
ally, the Government of Israel estimates that approximately
10,000 Israeli civilians were displaced, and the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports
that as many as 70 percent of residents in the communities living
close to the border with the Gaza Strip left their homes (HRC,
2015).
The IDF carried out more than 6,000 airstrikes in the Gaza Strip
during their operations11 there in 2014. These included targeted
attacks on residential and other buildings. IDF airstrikes destroyed
– in whole or in part – a significant number of houses12 (HRC,
2015). As stated in the United Nations Operational Satellite Applica-
tions Programme (UNOSAT), the concentration of damage in the
Gaza Strip was found along the Armistice Line13 with Israel; 74 per-
cent of all damaged and destroyed buildings and craters, identified
by satellite imagery, were found within three kilometers of the
Armistice Line (UNOSTAT, 2014). Fig. A1 in the Appendix 1 shows
the localization of damages to public infrastructure as a result of
the 2014 Gaza conflict.
Even if the 2014 hostilities erupted in a context of long-lasting
and complex crisis between the Palestinian territories and Israel,
the events of the summer of 2014 can be considered a short and
sharp episode of conflict. The violence that occurred there during
July and August 2014 saw dramatic consequences in terms of fatal-
ities, displacements and damages. In fact, as reported by B’tselem,
the number of fatalities resulting from IDF activities during the
Protective Edge operation is comparable to the number of fatalities
(of Palestinians killed in the Gaza Strip by the IDF) reported over an
eight-year period, from 2000 to 2008 (2,998), and is approximately
double the number of fatalities (again, of Palestinians killed in the
Gaza Strip by the IDF) reported during the ‘‘Cast Lead” operation14
(1,391). Therefore, the conflict events of summer 2014 in the Gaza
Strip can be considered an exogenous variation of violence in a
context of a protracted crisis.4. Data
4.1. Dataset
The dataset used in this analysis is from the fifth and sixth SEF-
Sec surveys administered in 2014 and 2015 in the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank by the PBCS in coordination with the FSS. The last
two editions of SEFSEc surveys (namely the fifth and sixth SEFSec)
constitute a panel dataset, interviewing the same sample of house-
holds before and after the Gaza conflict took place. The attrition11 As a result, according to OCHA, during the 2014 hostilities, 142 Palestinian
families had three or more members killed in the same incident owing to the
destruction of residential buildings, resulting in a total of 742 fatalities. An even
higher figure is reported by some non-governmental organizations, which claim that
1,066 people, including 370 children and 241 women, were killed inside their homes
(HRC, 2015). The total number of Palestinians killed by IDF during the Protective Edge
operation is 2,202, according to B’tselem. For additional information on the fatalities,
visit the B’tselem website: http://www.btselem.org/2014_gaza_conflict/en/.
12 According to OCHA (2016), 12,620 housing units were totally destroyed and 6,455
severely damaged.
13 The Armistice Line or Green Line is a demarcation line set by the 1949 Armistice
Agreements at the end of the 1948 conflict between Israeli and neighbor countries
(Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). The line sets the border between the Gaza Strip
and Israel.
14 The Cast Lead operation refers to a series of strikes in the Gaza Strip by the Israeli
army that took place between December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009, following
rocket attacks launched from the Gaza Strip into Israel.
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These two editions of data collection were undertaken, respec-
tively, during the first quarter of 2014 and of 2015, with a reference
period covering the six months preceding the interviews. As shown
in Fig. 1, the first round of data collection preceded by two months
the 2014 Gaza conflict, while the second round took place four
months after the ceasefire was established.
Finally, the sample is representative regarding the gender of
household head, refugee status, governorate and locality of the
households; these last two categories are respectively the second
(after region) and third levels of administrative units in the Pales-
tinian territories. Due to the scope of the study the sample of
households living in the West Bank is not included in the analysis.
The panel sample for the Gaza Strip employed in this analysis con-
sists of 2,412 households.15
4.2. Conflict exposure
In the sixth round of the SEFSec survey, households in the Gaza
Strip were asked questions related to the 2014 conflict (see
Table A1). One of the most relevant questions for capturing conflict
exposure at the household level is whether the ‘‘household’s main
residence has been fully or partially damaged because of the
aggression”. The importance of this question is based on the nature
of the Gaza conflict, which mixed airstrikes and ground operations
and resulted in significant building damages. Based on this ques-
tion, 58 percent of the interviewed households reported to have
been directly exposed to the 2014 Gaza conflict, considering
together full or partial residence damages (see Table 1).
The difference between full/extreme or partial residence dam-
ages reported in the survey strongly reflects the aggregated data
from OCHA (2016) and confirms the suitability of this variable
for capturing conflict exposure at the household level. In fact,
according to OCHA (2016), almost 18,000 homes were rendered
uninhabitable because of the conflict and 16,965 households lost
their home. This affected approximately only 5.49 percent (estima-
tion of the authors based on the OCHA homes’ damages and PCBS
data on the Gazan population)16 of the total number of households
located in the Gaza Strip in 2014. This percentage becomes closer in
numbers to that reported in the survey, if minor home damages are
also taken into consideration.17
In addition to the SEFSEc dataset (descriptive statistics reported
in Table A2) we employed the maps on Google, in oder to calculate
the distance from the center of the locality (the third level of regio-
nal administrative units in the Gaza Strip, after region and gover-
norate/district) where the household was located in the pre-
conflict18 time period to the border with Israel. Since the size of
the Gaza Strip is very small, while the number of localities is high15 From the original sample of 2,413 households, one observation has been dropped
in the analysis due to the lack of information related to the 2014 conflict.
16 The estimated number of households located in Gaza in 2014 was 308,622. The
total population in Gaza was 1,790,010 and the average household size was 5.8 (PCBS,
2014).
17 Taking into account minor damages dramatically increases the number of homes
damaged to 171,000. If the same proportion of home destruction is applied, the total
damages affected approximately 179,400 households, roughly 58 percent of the total
households located in Gaza. The proportion applied is the following: 17,800 (home
destroyed or severe damaged): 16,965 (households affected by destruction or severe
damages) = 171,000 (home destroyed or severed or major or minor damaged): X. The
estimated number of households affected by any (from total to minor) damages is
179,416, which corresponds to 58.13 percent of the total number of households.
18 Changes to place of residence during the time periods studied in this analysis is
not a concern. In fact, the distance variable can be considered fixed during the pre-
and post-conflict periods. Only a small percentage of households (approximately 3
percent, equivalent to 72 households) changed their place of residence because of the
conflict (see Table A1). Furthermore, changing place of residence does not necessarily
imply changing locality, from where the distance to the border is calculated. Indeed,
only 30 households report a different locality code in the two rounds of the survey.(25 are represented in the survey19), the constructed distance gives
an informative indication on the households’ location in relation to
the border. Moreover, to allow this variable to provide further
insights, the constructed distance (measured in kilometers) was
interacted with a dummy equal to one if the household is located
more than 1 km from the buffer zone – this is also referred to as
the ‘‘access restricted areas (ARA)”, a 300-meter wide strip20 of land
running along the border inside the Gaza Strip, which has been
under Israeli control since 2005.
The mean value of the distance to the border – interacted with
the dummy variable equal to zero for housing unit located less
than 1 km from the buffer zone – is 3.8 km; the range starts from
zero kilometers, referring to households located less than 1Km
from the buffer zone, to a maximum of 8.5 km from the border
(see Table A3). On average, the households closer to the border
are located in Gaza governorate, while those that are further away
from the border are in the governorate of Rafah (see Table A4).4.3. Food security
Despite the fact that a very extensive list of food security indi-
cators at the household level (reviewed by Pangaribowo, Gerber, &
Torero, 2013) is used in the empirical literature, two indicators are
employed in this analysis. The choice of two indicators here is
based on data availability and on the correspondence between food
security and resilience pillars’ indicators (Section 4.4).
The food expenditure (expressed in monthly per capita terms
using the rate for US dollars in 2014) captures the monetary aspect
of food security, while the Household Dietary Diversity Score
(HDDS) focuses on diversification of the household diet. The HDDS
represents the total number of consumed food groups where the
food groups considered in the score are the following: cereals,
tubers, vegetables, fruits, meat, egg, fish, pulses, milk, oil, sugar
and miscellaneous (Swindale & Bilinsky, 2006). The food consump-
tion questions included in the SEFSEc survey are not detailed
enough to allow us to compute the household caloric acquisition
(Hoddinott, 1999) which would require information at the level
of consumed food items.
The two indicators used in the analysis mainly refer to the avail-
ability of food and do not express the other dimensions of food
security (accessibility, utilization and stability). To capture the
dimension of food utilization, individual anthropometric data for
children should be considered but they are not included in the SEF-
Sec survey. Furthermore, child anthropometric post-conflict data
are not available in any other dataset (the most updated child mal-
nutrition data pre-conflict can be found in PCBS, 2015) collected in
the Gaza Strip.
To take into account the food accessibility, non-food factors
such as indicators of sanitary household conditions, water quality,
access to primary care should be used (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009).
This type of indicators are included in this analysis such as part
of the ABS pillar. The same applies to the indicators of social safety
nets as the participation in safety nets program that are recognized
as a proxy of the food stability in the empirical literature on food
security (Pangaribowo et al., 2013) but included in the SSN
resilience pillar in this paper.
Both food security indicators employed in this analysis show a
minor reduction in the post-conflict period compared to the
preceding round of data (see Table 2). Nevertheless the difference
of food security variation (post-pre conflict) between households19 There is a total of 42 localities in Gaza. The 25 localities represented in the survey
are distributed as follows: 5 in North Gaza, 3 in Gaza City, 7 in Deir al Balah, 6 in Khan
Yunis and 4 in Rafah.
20 A map showing the closed and restricted areas in the Gaza Strip is available here:
https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/Gaza_A0_2014_18.pdf.
Fig. 1. Timeline of data collections.
Table 1
Conflict exposure: residence damage.
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Residence damage
Fully/extremely 117 4.85 4.85
Partly 1,295 53.69 58.54
Any 1,000 41.46 100.00
Total 2,412 100.00
208 T. Brück et al. /World Development 119 (2019) 203–223that were and were not affected by the conflict is not statistically
significant.
Finally, recent food security analyses stress the role of percep-
tion and past experience to measure household food security
(Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). As a robustness check this paper
employes the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS)
score (Coates et al., 2007). The latter is a measure of the degree
of food insecurity in the household in the past four weeks (30 days)
before the interview. The score sums up the frequency during the
past four weeks that a household has experienced a list of particu-
lar food insecurity-related conditions.The conditions are the fol-
lowing: (1) anxiety that household will not have sufficient food;
(2) household members were not able to have preferred types of
food due to lack of resources; (3) household members had to eat
limited types of food due to lack of resources; (4) household mem-
bers had to eat undesirable food due to lack of resources; (5)
household members had to eat less food than what they need
because of insufficiency; (6) household members had to eat less
number of meals because of insufficient food; (7) absence of/insuf-
ficient food at home because of insufficient resources to purchase;
(8) any of household members had to sleep at night hungry
because there was insufficient food; (9) any household members
had to abstain from eating all day long because of insufficient food.
The possible answers are: never (0); once or twice (1); from 3–10
times (2); more than 3 times (3); don’t know. The score ranges
between 0 and 27; the higher the score, the more food insecurity
the household experienced.Table 2
Mean differences (post – pre conflict) food security indicators by household conflict expo
(1) (2)
Mean Mean
total sample households affe
by residence dam





Mean coefficients. Standard deviation in parentheses.
Food expenditure is expressed in logarithms.
T-test on the mean differences between households affected and not by residence dam
⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.4.4. Resilience
Following the FAO-RIMAmethodology, factor analysis is used to
estimate the so-called pillars of resilience, starting from observed
variables. The choice of the variables adopted for estimating each
pillar is based on literature review, data availability, context
analysis and the statistical properties of the variables.
 Access to Basic Services includes the following variables:
– Distance to health service – Distance in minutes to reach the
nearest health service. The variable is transformed into a
closeness indicator through a (min–max) re-scaling where
1 corresponds to zero distance in minutes and 0 to the max-
imum distance in minutes.
– Distance to school – Distance in minutes to reach the nearest
school. The variable is transformed into a closeness indicator
through a (min–max) re-scaling where 1 corresponds to zero
distance in minutes and 0 to the maximum distance in
minutes.
– Water cut – Dummy for not experiencing cut off in water
provision.
– Quality movement index – Perception on the effects of
restriction mobility to reach different places as work, land
etc. (0 big difficulty, don’t know; 1 minor difficulty; 2 no
difficulty).
– Toilet – Dummy equal to one for having a toilet with piped
water in the housing unit.
– Share of members with insurance -Number of household
members with health insurance divided by the household
size.
 Assets includes:
– House value pc – Monthly rental value of the house per
capita in USD.
– Land (ha) pc-Agricultural land (hectares) owned by the
household in per capita terms. It includes area of irrigated,
protected and rain fed vegetable, field crops, horticultural
and olive trees.sure (affected or not by residence damage).
(3) (4)
Mean Mean difference
cted households not affected affected -








Mean differences (post – pre conflict) of RCI and resilience pillars by household conflict exposure (affected or not by residence damage).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Mean Mean Mean difference
total sample households affected households not affected affected –
by residence damage by residence damage not affected
RCI 0.131 0.133 0.129 0.004
(0.393) (0.391) (0.396) (0.016)
ABS 0.268 0.284 0.245 0.039⁄
(0.386) (0.384) (0.388) (0.016)
AST 0.059 0.052 0.068 0.016
(0.754) (0.731) (0.786) (0.032)
AC 0.109 0.100 0.121 0.021
(0.819) (0.800) (0.847) (0.034)
SSN 0.074 0.302 0.248 0.549⁄⁄⁄
(1.656) (1.718) (1.507) (0.066)
Observations 2,413 1,412 1,000 2,412
Mean coefficients. Standard deviation in parentheses.
T-test on the mean differences between households affected and not by residence damage.
⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
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types of livestock into a single unit of measurement. The
conversion factor adopted is: 0.7 camel; 0.5 cattle; 0.3 don-
keys/mules; pigs 0.2; 0.1 sheep/goats; 0.01 chickens.
– Wealth index – Index which includes the number of wealth
assets (car, mobile, solar heater etc.) owned by the
household.
– Agricultural asset index-Index which includes the ownership
(dummy variables) of different agricultural assets (tractor,
plough, etc.).
 Adaptive capacity is composed by:
– Average education – Average years of education of house-
hold members.
– Coping Strategy Index (CSI) – Designed in 2008 by Dan
Maxwell for World Food Programme, the CSI is a rapid
assessment tool for measuring behaviour: specifically peo-
ple’s basic consumption-related coping responses to inade-
quate access to food. The CSI is a weighted sum of the
number of days the household adopted different strategies
to cope with food shortage in the past week. The strategies
and the associated weights in parentheses are the follow-
ing: Purchased low quality markets ‘‘leftover” (1); Pur-
chased food on credit (2); Reduced the portion of meals
for all household members (1); Reduced portion of food
for adults in favour of children’s (3); Reduced number of
daily meals (1).
– Share of full-employed members – The share of people
within the household with full-time (35 h) employment.
– Income diversification – Number of different sources of
household income (agriculture, business, private wage; pub-
lic wage, Israeli labour sector, transfers, properties, other)
 Social safety nets incorporate:
– Assistance in-kind – Monetary value of received in-kind
assistance per capita (food; free treatment/medicine; cloth-
ing; food ratio; school nutrition; inputs; drinking water;
electricity charging; housing).
– Assistance cash – Monetary value of received cash assistance
per capita (cash; compensation for martyrs).
– Assistance other – Monetary value of other assistance
received (not included as cash or in-kind) per capita
(employment/jobs; other).In the second step, a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes
(MIMIC) model is estimated (Bollen et al., 2010). A system of
equations is constructed, specifying the relationships between
an unobservable latent variable (resilience capacity), a set of out-
come indicators (food security indicators), and a set of attributes
(pillars). The food security indicators employed in the MIMIC
model are food expenditure per capita and HDDS. The main
advantage of using the MIMIC model in the second step is that
it allows for the inclusion of the food security indicators in the
measurement part of the estimation. Therefore, the Resilience
Capacity Index (RCI) is jointly estimated by its causes, the pillars,
and its food security indicators. In other words, this ensures that
the estimated RCI is properly linked with household food
security.
Appendix 2 presents the details on the FAO-RIMA methodology
employed for the estimation of the RCI and the resilience pillars.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 illustrate that in the post-
conflict period, the households exposed to the conflict, namely
those that experienced residence damage, have a lower figure for
ABS (thus, they have less access to basic services) and a higher
figure for SSN (thus, they use social safety networks to a greater
extent) than non-exposed households, compared to during the
pre-conflict period.5. Methodology for assessing the effect of conflict
We use a panel dataset of Gazan households interviewed before
and after the 2014 conflict to investigate the effect of violent
conflict on (i) household resilience and food security; and (ii)
resilience pillars and indicators (observed variables).
In order to identify households that were affected by the
conflict, and based on data available from the SEFSec dataset, we
employed a dummy variable equal to one if the household’s main
residence had been fully or partially damaged as a result of the
conflict. Due to the mixed nature of Israeli operations (both ground
operations and airstrikes) during the 2014 conflict, damages to res-
idences can be considered one of the most relevant discriminating
factors of conflict exposure at the household level. A symmetrical
indicator of conflict exposure was taken into consideration
(Section 6.3).
22 Dummy equal to one for living in rural localities, dummy equal to one for living in
urban localities, dummy equal to one for living in refugee camps; number of
household members; dummy equal to one for female household head; number of
children divided by the household size.
23 The list of shocks included in the two questionnaires is not the same. They have
been aggregated as following:
 Market shocks – 5th SEFSec: rising cost of food; rising cost of production
inputs; rising cost of other living; head of household or any members loss his
job; loss part or all wage/income; late in salary. 6th SEFSec: high cost of food sup-
ply; high cost of production input; loss of part or all of salary/income; delay of pay-
ment of salary.
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between conflict, on one side, and food security or resilience, on
the other, we use an IV approach. First, households’ conflict expo-
sure may be not random. This is the case if the operations carried
out by the IDF, and consequently damages, were targeted rather
than random.21 Second, although panel data can be used for control-
ling household heterogeneity time invariant, which may have an
impact on resilience in each period, they do not address every pos-
sible source of endogeneity. Indeed, there are several reasons why
conflict exposure (proxied by the residence damage variable) might
be endogenous to resilience capacity: there may be omitted factors
that affect both resilience capacity and conflict exposure; there
may also be a measurement error in how we measured the conflict
exposure. This may be driven by the use of a self-reported measure
of residence damages. The same applies to the link between conflict
and food security.
We adopt an IV approach, calculating conflict exposure using
the distance from the household’s location to the Israeli border
(which is also the Armistice Line). The closer the household is
located to the Israel border, the more likely its residence was to
be damaged during the Gaza conflict. This is supported by the data
on localization of building damages reported in Section 3 and
Fig. A1. Furthermore, the strategy of instrumenting conflict expo-
sure with the distance to geographical areas of maximum conflict
intensity – which could be either the border or the capital of a
country – is widespread in the empirical literature (Akresh & de
Walque, 2008; Voors et al., 2012; Miguel & Roland, 2011;
Rohner, Thoenig, & Zilibotti, 2013; Serneels & Verpoorten, 2015;
Ghorpade, 2017).
We believe that, under normal circumstances, there is no reason
why Palestinians households’ resilience or food security should be
influenced by their distance to the border. In fact, due to the small
size of the Gaza Strip, living conditions (job opportunities, food
availability, market access, etc.) in the territory can be considered
homogenous across the different districts. This is confirmed by the
prevalence of food insecurity in the sub-regions in 2014,where the
prevalence of severe food insecurity is consistent at 18 percent in
all the sub-regions (North, Center and South Gaza) (PCBS & FSS,
2016). The instrumental variable strategy we adopt in this analysis
assumes that the distance to the Israeli border has no fundamental
impact on household resilience capacity and food security in gen-
eral; this only has an impact for during the 2014 conflict, as a result
of the conflict itself. In the spirit of Ghorpade (2017), if variations in
food security and resilience that are correlated with the distance to
the Israeli border are essentially caused by the conflict, there
would be no threat to the exclusion restriction.
5.1. Food security and resilience
The main causal relationship of interest to the present analysis
is expressed as:
DYi ¼ a1 þ b1CONi þ b2Xi þ i ð1Þ21 A balance test on pre-conflict household characteristics was employed here in
order to test the randomness of exposure to residence damage. In other words, the
balance test is employed for investigating whether households exposed and not
exposed to residence damage present similar observable characteristics in the pre-
conflict period. The balance test, carried out on the mean differences of variables used
for estimating the RCI (Table A5) and control variables (Table A6), between
households exposed and not exposed to residence damage disproves the randomness
of the conflict. In fact, before the conflict, households that were not affected by
residence damage later on during the 2014 conflict were spending more on food; had
a more diverse diet; were wealthier, as confirmed by their higher house value and
wealth index; were more educated; and were less supported by cash and in-kind
assistance, compared to households that were not affected by residence damage.in which i = household; CON reports the conflict exposure (resi-
dence damage) dummy; X is the matrix of household control char-
acteristics,22 governorate (district) dummy variables indicating in
which of five governorate of the Gaza Strip the household is living,
dummy for whether any of the family members experienced a mar-
ket shocks in the six months preceeding the interview, dummy for
whether any of the family members experienced a manmade shocks
in the same period, dummy for natural shock, dummy for household,
dummy for other type of shock that affected the household that are
not included in the estimation of the RCI;23 Y represents, in sepa-
rated models, food expenditure, HDDS, or the RCI. Owing the endo-
geneity of CONi with Yi discussed in the previous section, b1 in Eq. (1)
will be biased. We therefore estimate a IV model to estimate causal
effects using 2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). IV first stage equation:
CONi ¼ a2 þ c1Distij þ c2Xi þ ui ð2Þ
Disti represents the distance between household i living in the
locality j and the Israeli border. As presented in Section 4.2 the dis-
tance to the border is interacted with the dummy variable equal to
zero for housing unit located less than 1 km from the buffer zone.
The second stage equation is given by Eq. (3) below, where b01
now reflects the effect of conflict on Yi:
DYi ¼ a01 þ b01 dCONi þ b02Xi þ i ð3Þ
Table 4 shows the IV first-stage results for the instrumentation
of conflict (residence damage) with the distance to the Israeli bor-
der. As expected, a higher distance from the Israeli border
decreases the likelihood that the household’s residence is damaged
by the conflict. In terms of basic diagnostics, the instrument
appears robust and valid: the Cragg-Donald (F) test shows a value
of 83.81, which is comfortably above the level of 10, below which
is recommended for identifying a weak instrument (Stock & Yogo,
2002).
Among the control variables, the only coefficient that signifi-
cantly changes with the inclusion of the distance variable is the
rural dummy. The potential concern related to the use of the dis-
tance as an instrument, which may proxy the rural location of
households in the Gaza Strip (if rural households are predomi-
nantly located close to or far away from the border with Israel) will
be addressed below through a dedicated robustness check.Manmade shocks – 5th SEFSec: loss of property business due to Israeli proce-
dures; failure to obtain a permit. 6th SEFSec: loss in assets or projects due to Israeli
measures; restriction imposed on access to land; lack of permits.
 Natural shocks – 5th SEFSec: loss of property or business due to natural dis-
asters. 6th SEFSec: bad weather conditions (storm, inundation, drought); damage to
crops (disease, failure, storage damage).
 Household shocks – 5th SEFSec: death/disability of the of one of the house-
hold members (not bread winner); death/disability of the bread winner. 6th SEFSec:
serious illness that inhibits performance of routine activities; death of family’s main
breadwinner; divorce cases; birth.
 Other shocks – 5th SEFSec: loss part or all aids. 6th SEFSec: shortage of water;
inability to repay loans; inability to receive health care because of lack of medicine
and equipment; inability to pay treatment cost; inability to travel abroad for edu-
cation; inability to travel abroad for treatment; inability to travel abroad for other
reasons (other than education or health); loss of assistance; loss in assets (including
land) and projects.
Table 4














Household size 0.013⁄⁄⁄ 0.011⁄⁄⁄
(0.004) (0.004)
Female household head 0.035 0.022
(0.037) (0.036)
Children share 0.038 0.029
(0.042) (0.042)








Market shocks 0.088 0.066
(0.071) (0.070)
Manmade shocks 0.072 0.063
(0.111) (0.109)
Natural shock 0.047 0.045
(0.050) (0.049)
Household shocks 0.032 0.012
(0.059) (0.058)






Cragg-Donald F Stat. 83.811
Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
The excluded dummies are camp for the localization and Deir al Balah for districts.
24 The differences in the observable variables between affected and non-affected
households are not statistically significant if the balance test – t-test on the mean
differences of the variables used for estimating the RCI and control variables – is
performed on sub-samples of households located less than 1 km from the buffer zone;
1 km from the border; 2 km from the border; 3 km and so on; up to the final group of
households located 9 km from the border. These results are not presented in this
analysis, but are available upon request.
25 The results obtained from the 2SLS specifications are quite different in terms of
the significance and magnitude of the coefficients as compared to the panel approach.
Thus, there is evidence that unobserved household time-varying heterogeneity affects
the OLS results that are available upon request.
T. Brück et al. /World Development 119 (2019) 203–223 211The size of the household is a positive and significant predictor
of conflict exposure, captured by the dummy for residence damage.
A household’s location in North Gaza, Gaza City and Khan Yunis
decreases its likelihood of being exposed to the conflict, compared
to those located in Deir al Balah where exposure likelihood is
higher. On the contrary, households in the Rafah district are more
exposed to the conflict than households in Deir al Balah. Conse-
quently, the district in which the household is located is an impor-
tant variable to be included in any empirical specification.
None of the self-reported shocks (other than conflict), classified
as market, man made, natural, households and other, have an effect
on the likelihood of experiencing residence damage. This confirms
the sudden and severe nature of the Gaza conflict. In fact, there is
no relationship detected between exposure to the Gaza conflict
and exposure to other (pre-conflict) shocks. For example, the loss
of assets as a result of IDF operations or the failure to obtain a per-
mit by Israel (the main man made shocks), cannot be considered
explanations for conflict exposure at the household level during
2014. In other words, we cannot find any significant association
between being a target for these kinds of Israeli regulatory proce-
dures (i.e. the need for a permit) pre-conflict and being affected by
residence damage during the 2014 conflict.
We believe that spurious correlation between instrumental
variable and endogenous conflict exposure variable as warned by
Christian & Barrett (2017) shuold not be a concern in our analysis.
In all specifications, we control for the governorate (district) dum-
mies, the second administrative unit after region. Furthermore, ourinstrument varies across the third administrative unit, namely the
localities. We do not think that the potential unknown sources of
coincident spatial trends (between residence damage and food
security or resilience) can apply at that administrative level.
Finally, we believe that the instrumental variable we use can limit
the selection bias between households exposed to and not exposed
to residence damage. In fact, in the first step, instrumenting the
binary dummy (for residence damage) with the continuous vari-
able (distance to the border) allows us to compare households
exposed and not exposed to conflict within specific distance ranges
from the border.24
5.2. Resilience pillars
To investigate the relationship between conflict and resilience
further, the estimated pillars – ABS, AST, AC and SSN – are used
as outcomes of interest in additional models using 2SLS. Therefore
the model 3 is estimated by employing the four resilience pillars as
outcome of interest, in separated equations:
DABSi ¼ a03 þ b01 dCONi þ b02Xi þ i ð4Þ
DASTi ¼ a04 þ b05 dCONi þ b06Xi þ i ð5Þ
DACi ¼ a05 þ b07 dCONi þ b08Xi þ i ð6Þ
DSSNi ¼ a06 þ b09 dCONi þ b010Xi þ i ð7Þ
Finally, to investigate the mechanisms that drive the potential
effect of the Gaza conflict on household resilience capacity, all
the observed variables employed for estimating the pillars are used
as outcomes of interest in additional regression models.
6. Results
6.1. Food security and resilience
Table 5 shows the second-step results of the 2SLS approach.25
Households affected by the conflict through residence damage show
a lower resilience capacity compared to non-affected households,
compared to the pre-conflict situation.
Any statistically significant effect of the conflict is detected on
the two food security indicators. The effect estimated here only
refers to the 2014 conflict. On the contrary, the Gaza Strip has a
long history of violence and instability that can impact how the
2014 conflict affected household food security in the considered
period. In fact, the persistency of the violence over time may have
‘‘structurally” affected the capacity of the households to cope with
the shocks. The lack of panel data referring to the period preceed-
ing the 2014 does not allow us to investigate this aspect.
6.2. Resilience pillars and indicators
The following Tables (from 6–9) further analyze the negative
effect of conflict on resilience by reporting the results of models
Table 5
Impact of residence damage on resilience and food security indicators: IV second-
stage results.
IV estimates











Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
Food expenditure is expressed in logarithms.
Household controls: household size, female household head, children share, and
rural/urban/camps.
District dummies: North Gaza, Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah.
Shock dummies: market shocks, manmade shocks, natural shocks, household
shocks and other shocks.
The excluded dummies are camp for the localization and Deir al Balah for districts.
Table 6
Impact of residence damage on ABS and indicators: IV second-stage results.
IV estimates
Dependent variable expressed in difference
ABS 0.277⁄⁄⁄
(0.096)
Closeness to health service 0.012
(0.023)














Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
The variable closeness to health services is a re-scaling (min–max) transformation
of the variable distance to health services (expressed in minutes).
The same transformation has been employed for the variable distance to school.
Household controls: household size, female household head, children share, and
rural/urban/camps.
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SSN). Furthemore, the effect of conflict on each pillars’ indicators
is tested.District dummies: North Gaza, Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah.
Shock dummies: market shocks, manmade shocks, natural shocks, household
shocks and other shocks.
The excluded dummies are camp for the localization and Deir al Balah for districts.
Table 7
Impact of residence damage on AST and indicators: IV second-stage results.
IV estimates















District dummies Yes6.2.1. Access to basic services
Table 6 looks at ABS. All the distances are expressed as close-
ness indicators. The bigger the value, the closer the household is
located to the service. Household exposed to conflict have a higher
figure for ABS. The effect is mainly driven by an improvement in
toilet quality and by a reduction in the distance to school.
After the conflict, a significant shortage of water services and
public healthcare affected the population in the Gaza Strip. More
than 33,000 meters of water and wastewater networks were dam-
aged (WB, 2016). These damages affected all households, not only
those directly exposed to residence damage. As soon as the conflict
was over many restoration interventions were put in place, mainly
targeting damaged households. Therefore, it could be the case that
conflict exposure in this instance resulted in an increase in access
to specific services for those affected by residence damage. Also,
we found that the proximity to school variable increases for house-
holds that experienced residence damage and in particular for
those that reported a full or extreme destruction.26 One potential
explanation is that schools have been used as residences from those
who completely lost their homes. Similarly the access to improved
sanitation could be linked to a change of residence because of the
residence damages.Observations 2,412
Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
Household controls: household size, female household head, children share, and
rural/urban/camps.
District dummies: North Gaza, Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah.
Shock dummies: market shocks, manmade shocks, natural shocks, household
shocks and other shocks.
The excluded dummies are camp for the localization and Deir al Balah for districts.6.2.2. Assets
Despite there being no statistically significant effects of the con-
flict on the pillar of AST, Table 7 shows some effects on land own-
ership, the wealth index and the agricultural asset index. The
greatest impact is found on the decrease in the wealth index. The
variable employed for capturing the exposure to conflict, residence
damage, can presumably explain the decrease in non-productive
assets associated with the household, for example a television or
solar heater. The destruction of assets is recognized as one of the
main cause of the persistency of poverty induced by conflict
(Justino, 2012). The positive effect of the conflict on land owned26 The difference (between the post- and pre-conflict periods) in proximity to school
indicators for households with residence damage is 0.001, while for households
without residence damage it is 0.008. The difference between the differences
(between households without damages and households with damages) is 0.030 (std.
err. 0.004).by households is less clear. The reported area of land owned, in
hectares, is based on a self-assessment by the survey respondent
and can be affected by measurement errors. Furthermore, the sam-
ple of households owning a plot of land is very small in the Gaza
Strip, due to the fact that the context is mainly urban.2727 Only 198 households reported to own a plot of land in 2014, while 308
households reported to own land in 2015.
Table 8
Impact of residence damage on AC and indicators: IV second-stage results.
IV estimates
Dependent variable expressed in difference
AC 0.415⁄⁄
(0.188)












Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
Household controls: household size, female household head, children share, and
rural/urban/camps.
District dummies: North Gaza, Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah.
Shock dummies: market shocks, manmade shocks, natural shocks, household
shocks and other shocks.
The excluded dummies are camp for the localization and Deir al Balah for districts.
Table 9
Impact of residence damage on SSN and indicators: IV second-stage results.
IV estimates
Dependent variable expressed in difference
SSN 2.498⁄⁄⁄
(0.425)
Assistance cash pc 1.311⁄⁄⁄
(0.411)
Assistance in-kind pc 1.567⁄⁄⁄
(0.333)






Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
Household controls: household size, female household head, children share, and
rural/urban/camps.
District dummies: North Gaza, Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah.
Shock dummies: market shocks, manmade shocks, natural shocks, household
shocks and other shocks.
The excluded dummies are camp for the localization and Deir al Balah for districts.
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The only pillar of resilience that was negatively and signifi-
cantly affected by the 2014 conflict is AC. Table 8 shows this effect
on the components that make up the AC pillar. AC is composed of
the variables of education, CSI, and two variables for the employ-
ment status of household members: one for the quality and stabil-
ity of the household members’ jobs and one for the diversification
of the income sources. While the effect of conflict on education and
CSI is not statistically significant, the effect is statistically
significant and negative for the share of household members with
full-time employment and for the income diversification indicator
(number of income-generating activities).
Any potential effects on education could be hidden by the fact
that the post-conflict survey was carried out four months after
the end of the conflict, which is too soon after the conflict ended;
the effect on education (measured using the number of years of
education of the household members) needs a longer time period
to be captured. In fact, Brück, Di Maio, & Miaari (2014) focus on
the effect of violent conflict on the academic achievement of high
school students during the period of the Second Intifada28 (2000–
2006) in the West Bank and find that the conflict has a negative
effect – on both the probability to pass the final high school exam
and to be admitted to university afterwards. Furthemore, the 2014
conflict in the Gaza Strip took place during summer when the
schools were closed.
The negative effect of the conflict on the AC pillar is presumably
driven by the consequences on the labor market. As stated in
World Bank (2016), the 2014 Gaza conflict significantly affected
the local economy: ‘‘economic activities have been and will con-
tinue to be drastically reduced for the duration of the conflict.”
The consequences on local employment opportunities have been
severe. ILO (2015) estimates an impact of the conflict on the Gaza
Strips’ labor market, the so called ‘‘disemployment” due to physical
destruction of productive assets, equal to about 6.4 percent of
employed persons and about 11.6 percent of the private and
non-governmental sectors’ 2013 workforce. Furthermore, these
effects tend to be persistent due to the fact that there is a time28 The First Intifada refers to a period of intensified violence between Palestinians
and the IDF that lasted from December 1987 until 1993. The Second Intifada, a period
characterized by frequent clashes between Palestinians and the IDF, lasted from
September 2000 to June 2006.lag between economic performance and the resulting effects on
the labor market.
The effect of the conflict on employment variables is clearly
detected. As expected, the conflict caused a decrease in stable
employment as well as in income diversification. This result is
aligned with other empirical analyses on the association between
employment opportunities and conflict, especially in the West
Bank. Recently, Amodio & Di Maio (2017) found that the Second
Intifada negatively affected the output value (in terms of total
and per-worker) of Palestinian establishments. On the other side
of this relationship, Miaari, Zussman, & Zussman (2014) find that
the localities heavily involved in the conflict during the Second
Intifada reported a bigger drop in employment opportunities than
did localities that were lesser involved in that conflict. To the best
of our knowledge, the empirical literature mainly focuses on the
West Bank and on the hostilities there preceding the summer of
2014. More evidence is needed on the effect of the 2014 Gaza con-
flict on the employment sector in the Gaza Strip.
The time lag between the ceasefire and the post-conflict data
collection may also explain the lack of effect on the CSI, which
measures consumption-related coping responses to inadequate
food access. The strategies considered in the index are, for exam-
ple, reducing the number of meals, and reducing the portion of
adult meals in favor of children’s meals. These strategies, if
adopted, would have presumably been adopted during the sum-
mer of 2014 and right after the end of the conflict. The significant
flow of food assistance received (during and after the conflict) may
have smoothed the adoption of coping strategies and therefore
reduced the impact of the conflict on the CSI four months after
the end of the hostilities.
6.2.4. Social safety nets
Among the different resilience pillars, the biggest impact of the
conflict is detected on SSN (Table 9). A possible explanation for this
result is the timeline of the data collection. As presented in the data
section, the post-conflict data collection took place four months
after the end of the Gaza conflict. During that period, many
national and international organizations supported the affected
populations with a substantial flow of assistance. The same day
of the ceasefire, more than 1,600 tons of aid and humanitarian sup-
plies entered the Gaza Strip (State of Israel, Ministry of Defense,
2014). In the months following the end of the conflict, assistance
to the Gaza Strip involved not only cash transfers but also assis-
tance for health and sanitation, which are relevant aspects of basic
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sented within the calculations of the ABS pillar). Between the
2014 conflict and June 2016, the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) dis-
tributed assistance to the value of more than USD190 million as
part of its Emergency Shelter Programme. This type of assistance
involved food, non-food items and potable water (UNRWA, 2015).
Table 9 shows the effect on the three singular components of
SSN. There is a positive and significant effect on all the types of
assistance considered in the analysis; cash, in-kind and other assis-
tance (mainly in the field of employment provision). As discussed
above, this is likely explained by the time lag between the end of
the conflict and the data collection. In terms of magnitude, the big-
gest impact is found on ‘‘other” forms of assistance, rather than
cash and in-kind assistance, which mainly includes employment
or job assistance (for the definition of the categories included in
this type of assistance, please see Section 4.4). Households exposed
to the conflict in terms of residence damage received more cash
and in-kind assistance than non-affected households (even in the
pre-conflict period). On the contrary, looking at ”other” types of
assistance (employment or job) in the pre-conflict period, there
is no statistically significant difference in the mean value of this
type of assistance received by households that will ultimately be
exposed and not exposed to the conflict (Table A5). While in the
pre-conflict period there are no differences in the amount of
employment or job assistance received among households, we find
that the conflict increased this type of assistance for the most
affected households.
6.3. Robustness checks
In order to test the robustness of the analysis, we first checked
whether households located in rural areas of the Gaza Strip com-
pound the conflict effect, given that households’ distance to the
border was employed for assessing levels of conflict exposure.
One may argue that rural households, if concentrated in some
specific area of the Gaza Strip close to the Israeli border, may be
more exposed to the conflict. First, the majority of the population
in the strip is urban or made up of camp dwellers,29 without access
to agricultural land. In this context, the ‘‘urban agriculture” has
become a key strategy for the Gazan population.
Second, Table A12 shows the second step results for the sub-
sample of non-rural households with the same format as Table 4.
In this step, the sample becomes slightly smaller because the 115
rural households have been removed. Nevertheless, the statistical
significance and magnitude of the coefficients is stable. The first
step results are shown in column 1, Table A13 in the annex. These
confirm that the distance between the household and the border is
a good predictor of residence damage, even in the sample of non-
rural households (the Cragg-Donald F. statistic decreases, but it is
comfortably above the acceptance value of 10).
To further check the analysis, we consider a symmetrical indica-
tor for conflict exposure. This robustness check is aimed at taking
into consideration potential measurement errors that affect the
indicator for residence damage. The alternative indicator employed
here is a dummyequal to one if the household hosted another family
or family member during the conflict. This indicator can be consid-
ered symmetrical to the one for residence damage. In fact, the fur-
ther away a household is from the border, the less it is affected by
the conflict and themore it is expected to offer help to other families
or individuals. Furthermore, this indicator can be considered as a29 The Gaza Strip counts eight recognized Palestinian refugee camps within its
borders, which host over half a million Palestinian refugees (UNRWA website, 2016
data). Additional information can be found here: https://www.unrwa.org/where-
we-work/gaza-strip.proxy of the household’s capacity to react and resist to shocks. As
expected, the effect of hosting another family or family member
has a symmetrical effect compared to the effect of reporting resi-
dence damage, which is the direct indicator of conflict exposure. In
fact, we find a statistically significant and positive effect on the RCI
as a result of hosting another family or family member, through an
increase in AC and a reduction in SSN and ABS (Table A14). First-
step results are reported in column 2 of Table A13.
As a final robustness check, we adopt an alternative indicator of
household food security as an outcome variable. Specifically, we
employ the HFIAS score. Table A15 shows the second-step IV
results of the conflict’s effect on the HFIAS variation. As expected,
the effect of the conflict is positive. The conflict has increased the
level of food insecurity for Gazan households. However, the effect
is not statistically significant when conflict exposure is instru-
mented with the distance from the household to the border. Some
unobserved factors, such as for example aspirations or expecta-
tions on the future, may play a role in explaining household food
security measured by HFIAS, due to subjective components of the
questions (for example, regarding ‘‘anxiety that the household will
not have sufficient food”). This may explain why, when the unob-
served heterogeneity is controlled for by the IV approach, the effect
of the conflict loses significance.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we study how a short but intense conflict affected
the resilience capacity and food security of households in the Gaza
Strip. By comparing the resilience capacity of households just
before and after the 2014 conflict, we are able to identify the causal
effects on key outcomes of interest. We find that while conflict
reduced the overall resilience capacity of households to a certain
extent, it also induced an aid response which led to an increase
in access to basic services and to social safety nets for
conflict-exposed households in the Gaza Strip. The importance of
this finding is threefold, including from a policy perspective.
Firstly, and in line with the significant volume of literature on
the micro-economics of conflict, the results highlight the impor-
tance of health and social sectors for development in a conflict-
affected economy. From medical services, to potable water access
and sanitation, to education, the recovery and resumption of these
basic services is critical for household resilience capacity, both for
households that are directly and indirectly affected by conflict.
Second, and beyond basic government services, the results indi-
cate the importance of labor markets in achieving sound household
resilience capacity. In particular, labor markets in the Gaza Strip
were unable to provide the income streams households needed
in order to maintain their livelihood. However, labor markets in
the Gaza Strip (and in Israel) are highly regulated and by no means
free and flexible. Yet in the case of the Gaza conflict, the negative
effects of restrictive labor markets for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip
were compounded further by the conflict.
Third, the results indicate the importance of the humanitarian
response to conflict. Development and humanitarian responses to
conflict are often analyzed separately. This paper demonstrates
the relevance that quick, short-term humanitarian aid deliveries
can have for the resilience capacity of households. This is likely
to have a long-lasting impact in the Gaza Strip, in what continues
to be a challenging environment for human development even in
the absence of active conflict. In other words, this paper con-
tributes to support the idea of bridging humanitarian and develop-
ment interventions, at least within the framework of conflict
response mechanisms.
Another major finding of this paper, which also contributes to
the literature on the nexus between conflict, resilience and food





Fully/extremely 117 4.85 4.85
Partly 1,295 53.69 58.54
Any 1,000 41.46 100.00
Total 2,412 100.00
Change of residence because of aggression
no 2,340 97.01 97.01
yes 72 2.99 100
Total 2,412 100
T. Brück et al. /World Development 119 (2019) 203–223 215translates into a contraction of household resilience. While a
potential negative effect on education is not detected with a short
time panel dataset such as the one that we adopted, the analysis
clearly demonstrates how the 2014 conflict has induced a contrac-
tion in income sources and stable employment. The reduction of
local employment opportunities is an immediate negative effect
which can be attributed to the conflict. This, besides being in line
with existing literature, provides clear policy indications as an
immediate response plan.
From a policy perspective, the case of the Gaza conflict also
demonstrates that immediate and significant support to victims
of conflict can indeed help restore resilience capacity. This is an
important finding in times when support for conflict victims is
being increasingly encouraged by people in Western democracies.
What remains to be investigated is if such support could even be
provided while conflict is ongoing, such as in the case of the recent
conflicts in Syria and South Sudan.
From a research perspective, the ways in which resilience
capacity is recovered in the long-term, several years after the
end of a conflict, still needs studying. The literature also needs to
establish how lower intensity conflict impacts on resilience capac-
ity. Most importantly, we need to understand if either type of con-
flict – lower intensity and higher intensity – may force households
below a lower critical threshold of resilience capacity, from which
households cannot recover without external assistance. This
threshold may be lower for individual households, but higher if a
large number of households are concurrently affected by conflict.
In the extreme scenario, conflict may create poverty traps from
which even initially resilient households cannot recover.
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United Nations.Appendix 1. Damage map of Gaza Strip and descriptive statisticsFood products on credit
no 973 40.41 40.41
yes 1,435 59.59 100
Total 2,408 100
Loan, borrowing or debt
no 1,121 46.5 46.5
yes 1,290 53.5 100
Total 2,411 100
Living standard deterioration
no 802 33.31 33.31
yes 1,606 66.69 100
Total 2,408 100
Income deterioration during aggression
no 1,151 47.76 47.76
yes 1,259 52.24 100
Total 2,410 100
Income deterioration after aggression
no 1,354 56.18 56.18
yes 1,056 43.82 100
Total 2,410 100
Any martyrs among household members
no 2,393 99.25 99.25
yes 18 0.75 100
Total 2,411 100
Hosting other family/members
no 1,501 62.26 62.26
yes 910 37.74 100
Total 2,411 100
Table A2
Summary statistics pre- and post-conflict.
Pre-conflict Post-conflict
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FS Food expenditure (USD) pc 46.828 29.821 2.84 368.71 41.301 32.431 0.13 384.96
HDDS 10.509 1.289 5 12 10.203 1.328 0 12
ABS Distance to health service (min.) 10.741 4.951 1 25 10.443 4.65 0 30
Distance to school (min.) 10.658 4.916 0 30 11.339 6.114 0 30
Water cut (dummy) 0.082 0.275 0 1 0.054 0.226 0 1
Quality movement index 1.807 0.462 0 2 0.648 0.787 0 2
Sanitation (dummy) 0.984 0.126 0 1 0.936 0.244 0 1
Share of members with insurance 0.96 0.164 0 1 0.944 0.194 0 1
AST House value pc 33.426 25.129 2.58 255.26 34.219 25.885 0 300
Land (ha) pc 0.002 0.015 0 0.37 0.003 0.02 0 0.50
TLU 0.001 0.019 0 0.82 0.001 0.013 0 0.42
Wealth index 0.011 0.635 2.09 6.43 0.009 0.737 1.79 4.14
Agricultural asset index 0.058 0.219 0 1.02 0.077 0.238 0 1.04
AC Average education 8.914 3.239 0 20 8.596 3.229 0 18.50
CSI 9.728 9.802 0 48 9.607 8.275 0 48
Share of full-employed members 0.124 0.148 0 1 0.088 0.127 0 1
Income diversification 1.656 0.648 0 5 1.826 0.728 0 5
SSN Assistance in-kind (USD) pc 4.255 5.195 0 80.36 5.063 9.633 0 127.04
Assistance cash (USD) pc 6.57 16.07 0 226.90 5.185 14.076 0 233.54
Assistance other (USD) pc 1.401 3.522 0 44.91 3.174 11.184 0 193.55
Control Rural (dummy) 0.048 0.213 0 1 0.047 0.213 0 1
Urban (dummy) 0.805 0.396 0 1 0.804 0.397 0 1
Camp (dummy) 0.148 0.355 0 1 0.148 0.355 0 1
Household size 6.073 2.782 1 26 6.274 2.701 1 24
Female household head (dummy) 0.085 0.278 0 1 0.088 0.283 0 1
Share of children 0.374 0.249 0 0.83 0.377 0.248 0 0.83
North Gaza (dummy) 0.197 0.398 0 1 0.198 0.398 0 1
Gaza (dummy) 0.325 0.469 0 1 0.325 0.469 0 1
Khan Yunis (dummy) 0.147 0.354 0 1 0.147 0.354 0 1
Deir al Balah (dummy) 0.202 0.401 0 1 0.202 0.402 0 1
Rafah (dummy) 0.128 0.335 0 1 0.128 0.334 0 1
Shocks Market (dummy) 0.981 0.138 0 1 0.964 0.185 0 1
Manmade (dummy) 0.008 0.088 0 1 0.261 0.439 0 1
Natural (dummy) 0.041 0.199 0 1 0.329 0.470 0 1
Household (dummy) 0.029 0.168 0 1 0.150 0.358 0 1
Other (dummy) 0.052 0.223 0 1 0.913 0.281 0 1
Observations 2,413 2,413
Table A3
Distance to the Israeli border: summary statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Distance (km) from locality centre to Israeli border 2,413 4.161 1.829 1.32 8.5
Dummy equal to one for housing unit located more than1 km from the buffer zone 2,413 0.904 0.295 0 1
Distance (km) to Israeli border interacted with the dummy housing unit located more than1 km from the buffer zone 2,413 3.886 2.148 0 8.5
Table A4
Distance (km) to the Israeli border interacted with the dummy housing unit located more than1 km from the buffer zone by governorate of Gaza Strip.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
North Gaza 476 3.346 1.548 0 4.45
Gaza 785 2.604 1.564 0 6.9
Khan Yunis 355 3.353 0.983 0 4.15
Deir al Balah 487 5.288 1.581 2.26 7.23
Rafah 310 6.370 2.619 0 8.5
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Table A5
Summary statistics of variables used for estimating the RCI by residence damage (pre-conflict).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Mean Mean Mean difference
total sample households affected households not affected affected –
by residence damage by residence damage not affected
Food expenditure pc (log) 3.712 3.668 3.775 0.107⁄⁄⁄
(0.552) (0.544) (0.557) (0.023)
Dietary Diversity Score 10.510 10.430 10.620 0.189⁄⁄⁄
(1.289) (1.326) (1.227) (0.053)
Dist. to health service 10.740 10.830 10.620 0.211
(4.951) (4.890) (5.039) (0.206)
Dist. to school 10.660 11.030 10.140 0.891⁄⁄⁄
(4.916) (4.779) (5.059) (0.204)
Water cut 0.083 0.097 0.062 0.035⁄⁄
(0.275) (0.296) (0.241) (0.011)
Quality movement 1.807 1.795 1.824 0.029
(0.462) (0.482) (0.430) (0.019)
Toilet 0.984 0.981 0.988 0.007
(0.126) (0.137) (0.109) (0.005)
Household members with health insurance 0.960 0.963 0.956 0.007
(0.164) (0.157) (0.174) (0.007)
House value pc 3.357 3.294 3.445 0.151⁄⁄⁄
(0.577) (0.582) (0.558) (0.024)
Land (Ha) pc 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.015) (0.012) (0.018) (0.001)
TLU pc 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.019) (0.002) (0.030) (0.001)
Wealth index 0.011 0.071 0.073 0.144⁄⁄⁄
(0.635) (0.603) (0.670) (0.027)
Agricultural asset index 0.058 0.063 0.051 0.012
(0.219) (0.228) (0.207) (0.009)
Average education 8.914 8.704 9.216 0.512⁄⁄⁄
(3.239) (3.170) (3.311) (0.134)
CSI 9.728 10.520 8.608 1.912⁄⁄⁄
(9.802) (9.907) (9.551) (0.401)
Full-employed members 0.124 0.115 0.138 0.023⁄⁄⁄
(0.148) (0.144) (0.153) (0.006)
Income diversification 1.656 1.687 1.613 0.074⁄⁄
(0.648) (0.665) (0.623) (0.027)
Assistance cash pc 0.832 0.893 0.746 0.148⁄⁄
(1.360) (1.395) (1.305) (0.056)
Assistance in-kind pc 1.186 1.269 1.069 0.200⁄⁄⁄
(1.026) (1.020) (1.024) (0.042)
Assistance other pc 0.486 0.492 0.476 0.015
(0.746) (0.734) (0.762) (0.031)
Observations 2,413 1,412 1,000 2,412
Standard deviation in parentheses.
T-test on the mean differences between households exposed and not to conflict.
⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
Table A6
Summary statistics of control variables by residence damage (pre-conflict).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Mean Mean Mean difference
total sample households affected by households not affected by affected –
residence damage residence damage not affected
Rural 0.048 0.062 0.027 0.035⁄⁄⁄
(0.213) (0.242) (0.162) (0.008)
Urban 0.805 0.786 0.832 0.046⁄⁄
(0.396) (0.410) (0.374) (0.016)
Camp 0.148 0.152 0.141 0.011
(0.355) (0.359) (0.348) (0.015)
Household size 6.073 6.186 5.914 0.272⁄
(2.782) (2.948) (2.523) (0.112)
Female household head 0.085 0.088 0.080 0.008
(0.278) (0.283) (0.271) (0.011)
Children share 0.374 0.373 0.375 0.003
(0.249) (0.249) (0.250) (0.010)
North Gaza 0.197 0.193 0.203 0.010
(0.398) (0.395) (0.402) (0.017)
Gaza 0.325 0.270 0.403 0.133⁄⁄⁄
(0.469) (0.444) (0.491) (0.020)
(continued on next page)
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Table A6 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Mean Mean Mean difference
total sample households affected by households not affected by affected –
residence damage residence damage not affected
Khan Yunis 0.147 0.180 0.101 0.079⁄⁄⁄
(0.354) (0.384) (0.301) (0.014)
Deir al Balah 0.202 0.178 0.236 0.058⁄⁄⁄
(0.401) (0.382) (0.425) (0.017)
Rafah 0.128 0.179 0.057 0.122⁄⁄⁄
(0.335) (0.384) (0.232) (0.013)
Market shocks 0.981 0.984 0.976 0.008
(0.138) (0.127) (0.153) (0.006)
Manmade shocks 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.003
(0.088) (0.096) (0.077) (0.004)
Natural shocks 0.041 0.042 0.041 0.001
(0.199) (0.200) (0.198) (0.008)
Household shocks 0.029 0.031 0.027 0.003
(0.168) (0.172) (0.162) (0.007)
Other shocks 0.052 0.051 0.054 0.003
(0.223) (0.220) (0.226) (0.009)
Observations 2,413 1,412 1,000 2,412
Standard deviation in parentheses.
T-test on the mean differences between households exposed and not to conflict.
⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
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In the first step, factor analysis is used to estimate the so-called
pillars of resilience. Tables A7–A10 show the results of the factor
analysis employed for estimating the pillars of resilience. The fac-
tors considered for each pillar are only those able to explain at least
95 percent of the variables’ variance.
In the second step, a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes
(MIMIC) model is estimated. A system of equations is constructed,
specifying the relationships between an unobservable latent vari-Table A7
ABS: Factor Loadings.
Factor1 Factor2
Closeness to health service 0.394 0.173
Closeness to school 0.344 0.080
Water cut 0.159 0.018
Toilet 0.176 0.276
Quality movement 0.131 0.336
Share of household members with insurance 0.067 0.085
The indicators of closeness to health services and school are re-scaling (min–max) transfo
minutes).
The number of factors used for estimating ABS is 3.




House value pc 0.032 0.413
TLU pc 0.163 0.009
Land (Ha) pc 0.583 0.146
Agricultural asset index 0.706 0.162
Wealth index 0.175 0.081
The number of factors used for estimating AST is 3.
They jointly explain the 95 % of the variable variance.able (resilience capacity), a set of outcome indicators (food security
indicators), and a set of attributes (pillars). The MIMIC model is
made up of two components, namely the measurement Eq. (1) –
reflecting that the observed indicators of food security are imper-
fect indicators of resilience capacity – and the structural Eq. (2),
which correlates to the estimated attributes of resilience capacity,




¼ ½k1; k2  ½RCI þ ½1; 2Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Uniqueness
0.045 0.036 0.021 0.811
0.150 0.051 0.010 0.850
0.198 0.008 0.057 0.932
0.080 0.001 0.064 0.882
0.048 0.019 0.041 0.865
0.080 0.106 0.023 0.970









Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness
Average education 0.538 0.069 0.115 0.692
CSI (inverse) 0.450 0.170 0.109 0.756
Income diversification 0.056 0.351 0.022 0.873
Full-employed members 0.616 0.153 0.019 0.597
The number of factors used for estimating AC is 2.




Assistance cash 0.574 0.114 0.657
Assistance in-kind 0.681 0.001 0.536
Assistance other 0.544 0.121 0.690
The number of factors used for estimating SSN is 1.

















P > Chi2 0.494
RMSA 0.000




Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01.









IV second-stage results: impact of residence damage on RCI, resilience pillars and food se
(1) (2) (3)
Diff. RCI Diff. ABS Diff. AST
Residence damaged 0.164⁄ 0.276⁄⁄⁄ 0.133
(0.091) (0.097) (0.163)
Urban 0.005 0.091⁄⁄⁄ 0.033
(0.023) (0.025) (0.042)
Household size 0.028⁄⁄⁄ 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Female household head 0.107⁄⁄⁄ 0.026 0.049
(0.031) (0.033) (0.055)
Children share 0.173⁄⁄⁄ 0.065⁄ 0.331⁄⁄⁄The MIMIC results present a good fit for the data (see
Table A11). All the pillars’ coefficients are statistically significant.Appendix 3. Estimates of the robustness testscurity indicators (urban sample).
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Diff. AC Diff. SSN Diff. Food expenditure Diff. HDDS
0.404⁄⁄ 2.698⁄⁄⁄ 0.120 0.053
(0.190) (0.442) (0.179) (0.409)
0.051 0.124 0.012 0.249⁄⁄
(0.049) (0.112) (0.046) (0.104)
0.048⁄⁄⁄ 0.022 0.073⁄⁄⁄ 0.017
(0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.015)
0.437⁄⁄⁄ 1.026⁄⁄⁄ 0.034 0.114
(0.064) (0.149) (0.061) (0.138)
0.501⁄⁄⁄ 0.850⁄⁄⁄ 0.338⁄⁄⁄ 0.037
(continued on next page)
Table A12 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Diff. RCI Diff. ABS Diff. AST Diff. AC Diff. SSN Diff. Food expenditure Diff. HDDS
(0.035) (0.038) (0.064) (0.074) (0.172) (0.070) (0.160)
North Gaza 0.047 0.100⁄⁄⁄ 0.044 0.077 0.088 0.042 0.035
(0.033) (0.035) (0.059) (0.069) (0.159) (0.065) (0.147)
Gaza 0.052 0.065⁄ 0.092 0.101 0.750⁄⁄⁄ 0.065 0.173
(0.036) (0.039) (0.066) (0.076) (0.177) (0.072) (0.164)
Khan Yunis 0.059 0.029 0.063 0.055 0.546⁄⁄⁄ 0.202⁄⁄⁄ 0.173
(0.036) (0.039) (0.065) (0.076) (0.176) (0.071) (0.163)
Rafah 0.087⁄⁄⁄ 0.012 0.107⁄ 0.309⁄⁄⁄ 0.300⁄ 0.204⁄⁄⁄ 0.055
(0.032) (0.035) (0.059) (0.068) (0.158) (0.064) (0.147)
Market shocks 0.042 0.158⁄⁄ 0.0003 0.042 0.450 0.029 0.423
(0.060) (0.064) (0.108) (0.126) (0.293) (0.119) (0.271)
Manmade shocks 0.042 0.028 0.106 0.338⁄ 0.419 0.159 0.694⁄
(0.092) (0.099) (0.166) (0.193) (0.448) (0.181) (0.415)
Natural shock 0.055 0.106⁄⁄ 0.146⁄ 0.019 0.065 0.100 0.028
(0.042) (0.045) (0.076) (0.088) (0.204) (0.082) (0.188)
Household shocks 0.137⁄⁄⁄ 0.045 0.254⁄⁄⁄ 0.288⁄⁄⁄ 0.607⁄⁄ 0.056 0.327
(0.049) (0.053) (0.088) (0.103) (0.238) (0.097) (0.220)
Other shocks 0.052 0.012 0.001 0.128⁄ 0.039 0.031 0.237
(0.036) (0.039) (0.066) (0.077) (0.177) (0.072) (0.164)
Constant 0.298⁄⁄⁄ 0.135 0.047 0.400⁄⁄ 1.669⁄⁄⁄ 0.718⁄⁄⁄ 0.801⁄⁄
(0.088) (0.094) (0.158) (0.184) (0.427) (0.173) (0.396)
Observations 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297
Food expenditure is expressed in logarithms.
Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
The excluded dummies are camp for the localization and Deir al Balah for districts.














Household size 0.011⁄⁄⁄ 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Female household head 0.044 0.061⁄
(0.037) (0.036)
Children share 0.045 0.022
(0.043) (0.042)








Market shocks 0.012 0.004
(0.073) (0.070)
Manmade shocks 0.052 0.129
(0.112) (0.110)
Natural shock 0.008 0.086⁄
(0.051) (0.049)
Household shocks 0.009 0.149⁄⁄
(0.060) (0.058)






Cragg-Donald F Stat. 48.86 81.75
Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
The excluded dummies are Deir al Balah for the districts.
The excluded dummies are camp in both models and additionally rural for model (1).
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Table A14
IV second-stage results: impact of hosting another family/family member on RCI, resilience pillars and food security indicators.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Diff. RCI Diff. ABS Diff. AST Diff. AC Diff. SSN Diff. Food expenditure Diff. HDDS
Hosting another family/family member 0.195⁄ 0.371⁄⁄⁄ 0.107 0.535⁄⁄ 3.257⁄⁄⁄ 0.146 0.045
(0.117) (0.126) (0.226) (0.251) (0.654) (0.228) (0.521)
Rural 0.006 0.261⁄⁄⁄ 0.130 0.099 0.010 0.016 0.484⁄⁄
(0.053) (0.057) (0.102) (0.113) (0.295) (0.103) (0.235)
Urban 0.005 0.110⁄⁄⁄ 0.028 0.020 0.057 0.004 0.247⁄⁄
(0.025) (0.026) (0.047) (0.053) (0.137) (0.048) (0.109)
Household size 0.027⁄⁄⁄ 0.003 0.000 0.045⁄⁄⁄ 0.006 0.073⁄⁄⁄ 0.0197
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.017) (0.006) (0.0138)
Female household head 0.092⁄⁄⁄ 0.019 0.024 0.391⁄⁄⁄ 0.771⁄⁄⁄ 0.042 0.105
(0.030) (0.033) (0.058) (0.065) (0.169) (0.059) (0.135)
Children share 0.178⁄⁄⁄ 0.062⁄ 0.363⁄⁄⁄ 0.510⁄⁄⁄ 0.821⁄⁄⁄ 0.337⁄⁄⁄ 0.0396
(0.034) (0.037) (0.067) (0.074) (0.193) (0.067) (0.154)
North Gaza 0.006 0.170⁄⁄⁄ 0.025 0.028 0.614⁄⁄⁄ 0.026 0.0220
(0.029) (0.031) (0.056) (0.063) (0.163) (0.057) (0.130)
Gaza 0.004 0.156⁄⁄⁄ 0.010 0.030 0.084 0.103⁄⁄ 0.149
(0.027) (0.028) (0.052) (0.057) (0.149) (0.052) (0.119)
Khan Yunis 0.009 0.123⁄⁄⁄ 0.010 0.177⁄⁄⁄ 0.281⁄ 0.159⁄⁄⁄ 0.147
(0.028) (0.030) (0.054) (0.060) (0.157) (0.055) (0.125)
Rafah 0.121⁄⁄⁄ 0.062 0.083 0.375⁄⁄⁄ 0.255 0.230⁄⁄⁄ 0.0103
(0.040) (0.044) (0.078) (0.087) (0.226) (0.079) (0.180)
Market shocks 0.040 0.126⁄⁄ 0.083 0.003 0.323 0.077 0.408
(0.057) (0.062) (0.110) (0.123) (0.320) (0.112) (0.255)
Manmade shocks 0.040 0.005 0.093 0.354⁄ 0.378 0.122 0.658
(0.091) (0.098) (0.176) (0.196) (0.511) (0.178) (0.407)
Natural shock 0.030 0.144⁄⁄⁄ 0.185⁄⁄ 0.050 0.480⁄⁄ 0.060 0.0249
(0.041) (0.044) (0.080) (0.089) (0.231) (0.081) (0.184)
Household shocks 0.110⁄⁄ 0.090⁄ 0.229⁄⁄ 0.219⁄⁄ 0.195 0.028 0.349
(0.050) (0.054) (0.096) (0.107) (0.279) (0.098) (0.223)
Other shocks 0.055 0.011 0.028 0.126⁄ 0.118 0.024 0.244
(0.036) (0.038) (0.069) (0.077) (0.200) (0.070) (0.159)
Constant 0.509⁄⁄⁄ 0.205⁄⁄ 0.065 0.899⁄⁄⁄ 1.692⁄⁄⁄ 0.922⁄⁄⁄ 0.824⁄⁄
(0.090) (0.097) (0.174) (0.194) (0.504) (0.176) (0.402)
Observations 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411
The sample of the analysis is composed by 2,411 observations due to the presence of two missing values for the dummy for hosting another family/family member.
Food expenditure is expressed in logarithms.
Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
The excluded dummies are camp for the localization and Deir al Balah for districts.
Table A15





























(continued on next page)













Standard errors in parentheses. ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
The excluded dummies are camp for the localization and Deir al Balah for districts.
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